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ABSTRACT
The 1930’s saw the widespread use of public opinion polling as a way to inform
lawmakers and the general public alike of where the masses stood on issues. These polls,
paired with newspapers and magazines from the time period, offer a rich glimpse into
1930’s United States. This paper will pull on this extensive pool of primary sources to
illustrate the story of the United States’ shift from isolationism to interventionism in the
era of Nazi Germany, appeasement, and World War II.

AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM THROUGH PUBLIC
OPINION, 1935-1939

Between the Great Depression and the United States’ entrance into World War II,
there was a drastic shift in American foreign policy. The 1930’s marked the height of
American isolationism while the early 1940’s marked some of the most notable
achievements of American interventionism. While the attitudes that drove foreign policy
in the heart of isolationism were clear and the attitudes that brought the country into total
war are commonly analyzed, what happened between these two distinct practices of
foreign policy is often overlooked. What is the story of the United States’ transformation
from isolationism to interventionism?
In 1940, an article in the widely read publication Reader’s Digest expressed the
revolutionary nature of public opinion polling. American public opinion polls served as a
“mirror” to the public and congressional lawmakers alike—the numbers demonstrated the
desires and opinions of the people with new transparency. Lawmakers, the writer
claimed, followed the polls—“from the White House to the Hill, and down through the
departments and bureaus—avidly.”1 Polls revealed the truth of the public’s desires and

heavily influenced the decisions of Congress, discredited self-interest lobbyists, and
forecasted election outcomes. Revolutionary, these public opinion polls of this author’s
contemporary were highly regarded as accurate. Consequently, their accuracy reveals to
the modern historian the attitudes that drove the country’s transformation from
isolationism to interventionism.
Two polling agencies dominated the field.2 Beginning in 1935, George Gallup
and the Gallup Poll were used as an authority after it correctly predicted the election of
1936 to go to Roosevelt. Elmo Roper was another major pollster, and his work was
reflected in Fortune magazine. Both were heavily influential in Washington and
Roosevelt himself often relied on them to glimpse into public opinion.3
Newspapers were also reflective of regional opinions as well as key to illustrating
the public sentiment. As often what one reads has great influence on their opinions,
especially on such volatile issues as neutrality, papers reflected the opinions of their
readers. Articles were closely examined to determine the tone and information that was
being presented to the American public.
How did the United States transform from a staunchly isolationist nation to a
staunchly interventionist one in a mere half decade? What were the emotions, ideas, and
opinions that Americans held to be true? How did these ideas drastically change in such
1
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1940), 37-40.
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For more information on how Roosevelt’s decisions were affected by public
opinion, see Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade (New York: Oxford University Press,
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a short period of time? A study of public opinion has largely ignored the 1930’s and a
comprehensive study has yet to be produced. This paper seeks to chart American public
opinion during this time through examining regional newspapers and polls.
This paper explores three periods and events to illustrate the turning points of
opinion. First, the Isolationist atmosphere of the 1930’s, from which interventionism was
gradually reincarnated will be examined: what viewpoints and sentiments caused the
United States to adopt a strict isolationist foreign policy from 1935-1939? What were
those policies and how did the public support them? Next, the Nazi conquest of
Czechoslovakia was the first significant and quantifiable turning point away from strict
isolationism. The Czech Issue, and the Munich Conference that followed, will be
dissected and the public reaction to both will be examined. Finally, when World War II
started in the European Theater with the invasion of Poland, Americans had to decide
what to do next. Opinion was cemented and a policy far different from the one of 1935
was established. These subtopics tell the story of the United States’ drastic shift from
isolationism to interventionism from 1935-1940 through analysis of public opinion.
After the stock market crash in 1929, the United States was heavily focused on
domestic issues as foreign policy took a backseat. As the country’s attention was on
itself, isolationism was the prevailing attitude of both the public and policy makers. In
November 1935, 71% of those surveyed stated that if a foreign nation attacked another
nation, the United States should not even form with other nations to stop the attack.4
Such was the extent of noninvolvement—for the majority of the public, any international
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intervention, let alone war, was distasteful. This pacifist attitude was widely recognizedand embraced-among the public. As one author wrote in the widely read pages of the
August 1935 Reader’s Digest, “at no time in history has pacifist sentiment been so
widespread and articulate.”5 With peace as the country’s utmost desire and itself as its
first priority, the United States sought a strictly non-interventionist policy.
In addition to the Great Depression, another major factor were the fresh memories
of the First World War. With the traumas of war fresh in mind, the Lost Generation
sought to do everything to prevent another. People also viewed entering in the war as a
mistake: Contemporary historians popularized the belief that World War I had been
orchestrated by merchant elites to gain profit.6 In the September 1935 issue of Reader’s
Digest, the historian Walter Millis’ Road to War was the supplement. His work blamed
the munitions industry and other business elites, as well as the sensationalist press, for
convincing “innumerable sensible Americans” that “Germans were a peculiarly fiendish
and brutal race.”7 His work was also demonstrative of the sympathetic, revisionist view
Americans held about the Versailles Treaty: Americans had “received, in the very first
days, what was to be perfected as the Allied thesis of the war. It was all due to the
undemocratic machinations of the Central European “autocracies.” Americans were now
to be surprised, shocked (and naturally pleased) to discover how everything they read
simply confirmed their first judgment.” The “stupefied Germans discovered themselves
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convicted before world opinion on the evidence of a few writers whom the vast majority
of Germans had never read or even heard of.” Millis painted the Germans as victims of
World War 1. While there is truth in his statement, this image convinced the American
public that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair, and sympathy excused Hitler’s nationalist
claims to territory. Many Americans held this attitude, and in August 1937, 31%--a
substantial portion of the public--believed that the Treaty of Versailles was “too severe.”8
These scholarly accounts complemented the work of the Nye Committee, whose
93 hearings of munitions business officials from 1934-1936 further convinced the public
that the country had been wrongly manipulated into World War I.9 The credibility of the
government and Wilsonian-interventionist ideals was greatly reduced. Such sentiments
ensured that the country was not ready to engage in another war anytime soon.
The findings of the Nye Committee and this historical assessment of World War I
carried Congress to action. Legislators passed the Neutrality Acts of 1935-1939, which
prohibited trade and loans to all belligerent nations and restricted American travel on
belligerent ships; and to propose the Ludlow Amendment--which would have made
Congress only able to declare war through national referendum. The public backed both
pieces of legislation. At an end of 1935, neutrality was listed as the third most “vital issue
before the American people” in the Gallup Poll. This served as evidence that the public
was in support of legislation that addressed what was cited as such a major problem.10
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Additionally, a November 1935 Gallup Poll showed 75% of people in favor of the
Ludlow Amendment.11 There was widespread support for such an amendment among all
parts of the country, and this pattern was mirrored in the support for the Neutrality Laws.
However, both laws did not see the end of the decade in their original form, and the
Ludlow Amendment was scrapped all together—a product of the country’s turn to
interventionism.
To explain neutrality’s eventual defeat, one has to have a complete picture of the
policy’s thriving years. While Americans were isolationist and valued neutrality, only a
small portion was actually in support of Hitler’s policies.12 This later compelled many to
convert to war, as most were not blind to the rising monster of Europe. Intellectuals,
politicians, and the general public watched the Nazi phenomenon from afar, noting its
disturbing nature and their malpractice.13 From the start of the Third Reich, newspapers
had criticized fascism, noting its clash with American values of democracy, and
cartoonists never missed an opportunity to illustrate Hitler as a cartoon villain. Doctor
SeussThe morality of the public was largely against fascism, and these attitudes
contributed to the country’s turn to neutrality when the time came.
As Europe drew closer to the eve of war, several events shifted American public
opinion from neutrality to interventionism. From 1935-1938, a steady decrease in

11

Ibid., 3.

12

This portion can be reflected in those 8,500,000 people who both listened and
stated that they agreed with Father Charles Coughlin in a May 8, 1938 Gallup Poll. Ibid.,
114.
13

See Emil Lengyel, “An Inside View of the Nazis by a Former Party Member,”
The New York Times, 87:29163 (November 1937), 3.
6

isolationist sentiment swept the country. What happened between 1935-1938 to cause
isolationism to lose some of its momentum? Increasing reports from Europe and Asia
were one factor. The press, though not pro-interventionist, highlighted the atrocities done
by the fascists and was sympathetic towards the European nations. However, the attitude
of major American newspapers was sure to distinguish these problems as European and
contained in Europe, and alluded to the “whole broad ocean” that separated the United
States from Europe.14 This was key to revealing the isolationist undercurrent of the
country and was reflected in the polls: while most of the public recognized the atrocities
being committed and sympathized with a non-fascist side, the general consensus was that
the country should not get involved.15
Thus was the attitude in August 1938. Hitler had been having a successful few
years. Reports of the Rhineland remilitarization and the Anschluss showed the United
States’ Germany’s aggressiveness. Subsequently, Germany began planning an attack on
Czechoslovakia. Three and a quarter million Germans lived in the Czech Sudetenland,
many of whom caught the “virus of National Socialism.”16 By 1938, the majority of
Sudeten Germans were Czech Nazis, and had been taking orders from Berlin for three
years.17 They wreaked havoc in the country and protested to be united with Germany.
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Hitler used this majority as a pretext for assuming the Sudetenland and eventually
all of Czechoslovakia. Unaware of Hitler’s larger goal of grabbing all of the country,
many Europeans believed that “all Hitler wanted was justice for his kinsfolk in
Czechoslovakia.”18 However, opinions in the United States saw straight through Hitler’s
demands and postulated that the issue would lead to war. “It is here that the world war
will start if it is to come within 1938 to 1939,” wrote the Oregonian of Portland,
Oregon.19 All around the country, people believed that the issue would result in war if
not solved.
Hitler had planned his attack for October 1st. But when the Czech government
began to mobilize on their German borders after hearing Germany’s intentions, the issue
was given a sense of urgency. As the European powers struggled with negotiations, the
prospect of war was flipped on and off: sometimes it seemed as though war was certain
while others peace was found. First, on September 15, Chamberlain came to negotiate
with Hitler in an effort to keep the world out of war. Armed with an urging of the Czechs
to follow “self determination”, Chamberlain drafted a plan to negotiate secession with the
Czechs if that meant the continent would stay out of war. For the next week,
Chamberlain and Europe gave a sigh of relief: it seemed as though the prime minister
had kept the continent out of war. The anxiety of American newspapers slightly
alleviated. As Nonpareil of Council Bluffs, Iowa put it, Chamberlain “at least gained
delay” and elongated the peace.20 But when Chamberlain returned again to talk over
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plans with Hitler on September 22, Hitler rejected his proposal, as he wanted to invade
Czechoslovakia before October 1st rather than to wait for the Sudetenland to be handed
over to him. Thus he “burned his bridges” and Europe was again on the edge of war.21
Newspapers began to print headlines such as “The Crisis Remains”22 and began to worry
for war. On September 25, Hitler gave a fiery speech that promised an invasion. The
world, and the United States, was deeply troubled with the thought of another war. But
Hitler quickly changed his mind at the advice of Mussolini, and sought to once again
negotiate. On September 29-30, the Munich Agreement was the product of such
negotiations, and the Sudetenland was handed over to Hitler after negotiations with
Britain, France, and Italy. As Hitler promised that this was his last territorial grab, the
watching world relaxed and rejoiced as they thought war was avoided.
What did Americans think of this scheme? Opinion was split. Many praised
Chamberlain for maintaining peace. Polls showed that at the end of the Sudeten
negotiations, 59% of the population agreed that appeasement was better than going to
war. However, an equal amount thought that the Munich Agreement would not lead to
peace but to war.23 The attitude was that of a recognized betrayal of Czechoslovakia but
an acceptance of that as a necessity to maintain peace. To the majority Americans, it was
“the best thing to do” at the time.24 As The Bangor Daily News of Maine said, “betrayal
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is a disagreeable word, especially when coupled with considerations of price, even when
the price may be avoidance of war…betrayal is perhaps too strong a word to be applied to
its course…but this is not a thing about which Americans can afford to be smug. We are
not so keen about rescuing distressed sister democracies that we want to go to war on
their account.”25 Americans felt sympathetic towards letting their sister democracy down
but acknowledged the Czechs as a sacrifice to peace, that in the “general rejoicing”, a “a
word of sympathy is expressed here and there for Czechoslovakia…”26 Part of the
sentiment was directed towards Britain and France for breaking the Czech-Franco
alliance treaties, but the relief of avoiding war overrode this feeling.
Though the public rejoiced at the present peace, praise of Munich was usually
followed by an expression of the uncertainty of the future and the possibility of war
further on. Only 8% of the public believed that Hitler had no more territorial ambitions
in Europe.27 The newspapers acknowledged the uneasy peace, saying that “war has been
prevented; peace remains to be perfected.”28 Some felt hopeful that Germany and its
people wanted to avoid war in the future. When Hitler rolled the military down the
streets of Berlin, Germans met the display of aggression with negative public sentiment.29
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Many people took this as a sign of Germany’s ability to be better in the future and some
even went as far to say that Munich demonstrated that Hitler could be controlled in the
future.30 Others called for more implementations of peace, such as more negotiations
towards peace.
For American public opinion, Hitler’s conquest of Czechoslovakia left the
country more convinced a war would occur. This translated into a new push for
rearmament: in February of 1938, half of the population had been willing to give up the
Navy for disarmament, and in July of that year 68% had expressed desire for a world
disarmament conference. After the Munich crisis, this 71% now wanted a larger navy
instead of a smaller one, and this number only kept on growing as 1939 approached. The
public wanted more adequate defense. As the Daily Hawkeye Gazette of Burlington,
Iowa put it, “And so America itself….has to arm with the rest [of the world powers].”31
While people certainly did not want to fight in a European war, many grew convinced
that if a war occurred, the United States would be swept into it. Rearmament made the
country prepared and marked effect of the Munich crisis.
After the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Poland was next on Hitler’s agenda. The
Treaty of Versailles cut out East Prussia from the Reich, giving it to Poland. The Polish
Corridor, which would have given Germany access to the sea, and Danzig, which was an
important port city and historically part of Germany, had been carved out by Versailles
and given to Poland, or put under heavy Polish economic influence. To most Germans,
these were the highest offenses of the treaty and Poland was the “most hated and despised

30
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enemy.”32 From the very beginning of his rule, Hitler had wanted to seek vengeance on
Poland.
But since the Polish-German Pact of 1934, Poland had supported Germany in
their endeavors. What changed in January of 1939 was Hitler’s insistence to retaking the
Polish Corridor and Danzig. Poland was only willing to replace the League of Nations’
guarantee of Danzig with a German-Polish agreement about the status of Danzig, but not
willing to violate the pact and insisted that any German attempt to ‘“incorporate the Free
City into the Reich must inevitably lead to conflict.’”33
Still, Hitler persisted. When Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia on March
15, German forces flanked Poland. War was looming on the horizon. On March 22,
Poland suggested a secret Anglo-Polish agreement for mutual assistance. This led to
Chamberlain’s declaration on March 31 that Britain and France would lend “all support
in their power” if Poland was attacked. This marked the Allies’ turn to interventionism.
How did the American public react to this? Most papers commended Chamberlain’s
sudden shift in foreign policy, recognizing its importance to Poland and the world: “Do
not underestimate the announcement of Prime Minister Chamberlain…the British French
guarantee actually means something,” said the Oregonian.34 Some recognized that
Chamberlain was too late in his policies. A Richmond Times Dispatch cartoon agreed as

32
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they published a tiny Chamberlain trying to rope a bloated Nazi foot back.35 All the
while, the papers recognized that the world was closer to another war. Still, publications
continued in their detached tone—these were still far off problems, not the main issue of
the United States’ concern.
While this was the sentiment of the general public, Roosevelt had sent Hitler a
telegram bluntly asking if Germany could “give assurance that your [German] armed
forces will not attack or invade the territory of the following independent nations”36 and,
then, listed 31 nations.
Interestingly, in May 1939 the polls showed a dramatic 19% decrease in people
who believed that a war would take place in the next year.37 What suddenly shifted the
country to have more confidence in peace? Did France and Britain’s pledge to get
involved if aggression occurred convince the United States that Germany was too
intimidated to attack Poland? The opposite sentiment was found in the newspapers.
Chamberlain had told the House of Commons that Poland was “not worth war” on May
3. The press took this to mean that Britain and France had moved to negotiations, and the
public seemed to believe that another Munich was possible.38
Whatever the reason, the United States underestimated Hitler. All throughout the
summer, Hitler and his generals were making preparations towards war. Negotiations
occurred behind closed doors and the only major news that was widely discussed was the
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Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. From May, June, and July saw a significant drop in
discussion of Hitler in papers.
By the end of August, war was again on the horizon as all sides militarized. In
Berlin, the press felt that war was inevitable.39 While Hitler hoped the Soviet turn to
neutrality dissuaded the British and cleared his way for his attack, Britain was firm in
their opposition. Hitler too was firm and went ahead with the attack anyway; falsely
listing that Germany had first been provoked by Poland as an excuse. Britain and France
declared war two days later--September 3—when the German attack continued. World
War II had begun, and the American press, now more than ever, had a heightened
uncertainty about American neutrality.
Though the public stressed how they did not want to get involved in another
messy European conflict, the country was now ready for peaceful interventionism: only
1% wanted to enter the war, but 50% now supported some form of selling supplies—later
manifested as the Lend-Lease Act.40 While it took an attack on American soil to convince
the country to engage in violent interventionism, the end of the Polish conflict marked the
beginning of formal American interventionism into World War II. Supported by the polls,
Roosevelt called on Congress to revise the neutrality laws with one that allowed arms to
be bought and carried on belligerent ships. Passed in December 4, 1939, the cash-andcarry neutrality law marked the United States’ peaceful interventionism and
transformation from isolationism.
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From 1935 to 1939, the polls showed heavy favor of noninterventionism.
Neutrality was on the minds of the American public and viewed as a crucial issue. In
1935, when asked what the most important issue at the time was by Gallup, both
Democratic and Republican members of the voting public put neutrality in their top five
concerns. Additionally, 1935 was the year of the most isolationist sentiment. Roughly
30% of the public felt that the United States should join if a war was involved. The
attitude at the time was that of strong anti-war as people were still shaken from World
War I. This was paired with calls for disarmament and a general desire for pacifism.
When Czechoslovakia occurred, a shift happened. The United States had not
thought a European war would arise. Now, the public felt that war was bound to occur.
The United States just wanted to stay out of it. This caused the public to advocate for
self-defense, a change from rearmament. However, it was not until Poland and the
European start of the war, that the United States decided to engage in non-violent
interventionism through the selling of supplies to any belligerent nation. Thus, the turn
from isolationism was complete.
These sentiments were largely universal, with only slight fluctuations between
region and party. Largely, these shifts were bipartisan as numbers in support for
interventionism went up among Democrats and Republicans alike. And while some
accused the Gallup Poll of being too Republican and the Roper Poll of being too
Democratic in leaning, these party affiliations did not interfere with the opinions they
recorded—both showed a public willing to intervene.
All throughout these years, slight regional differences were demonstrated. 19351936 showed regions farther West, such as the Mountain, Pacific Cast, and the
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Midwestern (called East Central by agencies) leaning more isolationist while New
England and the Mid-Atlantic had more interventionist sentiments. Consistently, the
South was the most interventionist out of all the regions. When asked about needing the
approval of the people to declare war, only 70% of Southerners felt that this was
necessary, 9% lower than the 79% percent of Mountain region dwellers who said yes.41
Why were Southerners more interventionist than their countrymen? There is a
correlation between this and party affiliation. The South was the most supportive of the
Democratic Party and Roosevelt, and Roosevelt was an advocate for interventionism.
Conversely, the overwhelming majority of Southern papers were Democratic and
supported Roosevelt.42 Roosevelt was a more interventionist than many of his
contemporaries, pushing for the change in the Neutrality Acts.43
In a short four years, the country shifted from heavily isolationist to in clear
support of the Allies. Examining sources as reactionary to the global events that occurred
saw how this happened. Allowing these sources and data to speak for themselves, clear
connections were made, mapping out the story of American isolationism to
interventionism through the use of primary sources. What was discovered was far more
complex than one voice of opinion, but several that were heard together to shape the
United States’ path from isolationism to interventionism.
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